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ON-SITE INVESTIGATIONS
by  Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.   On-site investigations are central to an effective regime to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).   On-site measures were discussed extensively by the
Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, known as VEREX, set up by the Third Review
Conference1 to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and
technical standpoint.   VEREX met twice in 1992 and twice in 1993 and examined the
following on-site measures:
On-site Measures
- Exchange visits - international arrangements
- Interviewing (on-site)
- Visual inspection (on-site)
- Identification of key equipment (on-site)
- Auditing (on-site)
- Sampling and identification (on-site)
- Medical examination (on-site)
- Continuous monitoring by instruments (on-site)
- Continuous monitoring by personnel (on-site)
Its final report2 prepared in September 1993 stated that:
The measure "Declarations" was most frequently identified for application in
combination with other measures.   The most frequently identified on-site measures in
combination were on-site inspections (interviewing, visual inspection, identification
of key equipment, sampling and identification, auditing).   This does not mean that
all the measures in parenthesis above always would be included in an on-site
inspection. [Emphasis added].
2.    These VEREX considerations took place during the period immediately after the
Conference on Disarmament had completed the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) with its verification regime comprising both routine and challenge
inspections and whilst the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq was
carrying out on-site inspections of both chemical and biological facilities in Iraq using experts
from many of the States Parties to the BTWC to carry out these on-site inspections.
3.   This Briefing Paper examines the arguments as to why on-site investigations are central to
a strengthened regime for the BTWC drawing upon the previous VEREX, CWC and
UNSCOM experience.   It concludes that on-site investigations are an essential element of a
future legally binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC.   The broad consensus that has
                                                
1   United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.
2United Nations,  Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification
Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993.
been developed by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) towards a legally binding instrument
comprising declarations and on-site investigations of non-compliance concern together with
the support by many delegations for further visits -- non-challenge visits and clarification
visits -- is examined and areas identified where the AHG needs to flesh out the rolling text.
VEREX Considerations
4.   The mandate for VEREX was to identify and examine from a scientific and technical
standpoint measures which could determine:
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining
weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
These measures were to be examined in terms of six main criteria:
- Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality
of information they provide, and fail to provide;
- Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
- Their ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance;
- Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
- Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications;
- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development
and other permitted activities, and their implications for the confidentiality of
commercial proprietary information.
5.    There was widespread support for the concept of international on-site inspections from
the outset of VEREX.   Thus in VEREX I, India tabled a working paper3 that stated:
"The visits of the verification team need not be announced in advance.  The team may
visit any site both declared or undeclared of production or research and development
and should have full access to all parts of the establishment in question .....  The team
may also interview any of the workers in the establishment".
The paper made it clear that such a verification team would include appropriate experts such
as microbiologists, biotechnologists and administrators experienced in the study of financial
records and production records.
                                                
3United Nations, A preliminary approach to the verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention,
Working Paper by India, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.29, 9 April 1992.
6.   Other views were expressed by Iran4 who said that:
"Since research on biological warfare agents does not require large plants with various
and complicated systems, the distinction between peaceful and prohibited activities is
not an easy task.  Consequently, evaluation and monitoring of biological facilities, in
order to trace any possible biological weapons production will be extremely difficult
and a costly enterprise.  To implement an effective monitoring system, there is first a
need for highly qualified and trained inspectors in the field of microbiology,
immunology, aerobiology, fermentation, toxicology and biochemistry".
7.   Peru clearly identified5 the need for challenge inspections:
"The second pillar of the verification system would be constituted by challenge
inspections, to eliminate any concern or doubt a State Party might have regarding the
activities of another.  It might be possible to draw on the model to be included in the
future chemical weapons convention.  However, because of the nature of pathogens
and the danger they present, challenge inspections in the biological field might have
other features."
and went on to say:
"In short, Mr Chairman, whatever potential verification measures we succeed in
identifying and examining, the final result can only be a simple verification system.....
founded basically on declarations and follow–up visits, challenge inspections and
monitoring of transfers."
8. The VEREX I report6  identified under On–Site Measures the following
2.  INSPECTIONS
2.1  Interviewing
2.2  Visual inspection
2.3  Identification of key equipment
2.4  Auditing
2.5  Sampling and identification
2.6  Medical Examination
7. VEREX II saw the preparation of reports on each of the six separate measures
identified in VEREX I by Rapporteurs:
a.  Interviewing – A. A. Mohammadi (Iran)
                                                
4United Nations, Elements of biological weapons monitoring systems, Working Paper by Islamic Republic of
Iran, BWC/CONF.III/WP.25, 7 April 1992.
5United Nations, Statement by the head of the delegation of Peru, Dr Felix Calderon to the Ad Hoc Group of
Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical
Standpoint set up under the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons,
Working Paper by Peru, BWC/CONF.III/WP.22, 6 April 1992.
6United Nations,  Summary of the work of the Ad Hoc Group for the period 30 March to 10 April 1992,  Report
BWC/CONF.III/VEREX 2, 13 April 1992
b.  Visual inspection – A. A. Mohammadi, Iran
c.  Identification of key equipment – Ake Bovallius, Sweden
d.  Auditing (On–site) – D. O. Arnold–Foster, UK
e.  Sampling and identification (on–site) – Patrice Binder, France
f.  Medical examination – Marian Negut, Romania
8.   At VEREX II Brazil  stated7 that:
"The on–site proposed measures were grouped into exchange of visits, inspections
and continuous monitoring.  Obviously the most intrusive activity is the second one -–
inspections.  Exchange of visits are traditionally linked with the initial step towards
the increase of transparency and to improve confidence and perhaps is the most
important way for cooperation and technology transfer, as pointed by Article X of the
BTW Convention".
and went on to say:
"On–site inspections are, of course, the more difficult task.  Preparation of previous
informations, and multi–disciplinary teams for on site inspections, rules of procedure
to guide inspections, confidentiality regulations, standardization of sampling and
identification methods procedures for routine and at short notice inspections, and
finally inspection reports will be needed."
9.  The summary report8 of VEREX II included the reports of the rapporteurs noting that
"These summaries, which are not considered to be exhaustive and might be further specified
during evaluation, were thoroughly discussed by the Group, producing consolidated texts to
serve as a basis of the beginning of the evaluation".  These summaries include useful points
on on-site inspections:
"On–site visit to facilities and establishments with activities of potential relevance to
the objectives of the Convention is generally carried out by various national and
international institutions and under different legislations in almost all countries.  The
inspectors of WHO have already routine visits to biological and industrial centres.
These centres and facilities are used to and in practice are under the obligation to
accept visits by responsible national authorities, particularly when they implement
GMP, GLP and Biosafety type regulations.  It can therefore be concluded that such a
visual inspection is not uncommon or unusual for such establishments.
 (Mohammadi, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.82/Rev.1)
                                                
7United Nations, Preliminary Aspects on the Evaluation of the Potential Verification Measures as they were
proposed during the First meeting of the Governmental Expert Group,  Working Paper by Brazil,
BWC/CONF.III/WP.54, 25 November 1992.
8United Nations,  Summary of the work of the Ad Hoc Group for the period 23 November to 4 December 1992,
Report BWC/CONF.III/VEREX 4, 8 December 1992
"An essential part of an on–site inspection is the assessment of a facilities capacities
and the equipment used to ensure that the equipment is not used for prohibited
activities.  Another aspect of on–site inspections is to confirm declarations"
(Bovallius, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.83/Rev.1)
10.   The subsequent VEREX meetings, VEREX III and VEREX IV, continued the evaluation
of the various measures leading to the conclusion in the final VEREX report that "potential
verification measures as identified and evaluated could be useful in varying degrees in
enhancing confidence, through increased transparency, that States parties were fulfilling their
obligations under the BWC."
Special Conference
11. The final report of VEREX was then considered by the Special Conference in
September 1994.  The report of the Special Conference noted9 that the VEREX report
considered that "some combinations of some potential verification measures, including both
off-site and on-site measures, could provide information which could be useful for the main
objective of the Biological Weapons Convention." [Emphasis added].   It was thus apparent
that there was a general acceptance at the Special Conference of the need for both off-site and
on-site measures to strengthen the BTWC.
12.   At the Special Conference, States Parties agreed to establish a further Ad Hoc Group
with the objective being to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification
measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in
a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties.   In
this context, the Ad Hoc Group shall, inter alia,  consider:
- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and
types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the
Convention;
- The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and
transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;
- A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as
appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report.
Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost
effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the
effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse; [Emphasis
added]
- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X,
which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under
the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to
impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the
                                                
9United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 19 - 30 September 1994, Geneva.
objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology,
equipment and materials.
The mandate also required that
- Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to 
protect sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national 
security needs.
- Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to
avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation
and industrial development.
The remit for the AHG also made it clear that "the regime would include, inter alia, potential
verification measures, as well as agreed procedures and mechanisms for their efficient
implementation and measures for the investigation of alleged use."
13.   The mandate for the AHG thus requires measures applicable to all relevant facilities and
activities as well as for the investigation of alleged use.
CWC Inspections
14.   The CWC10 which opened for signature on 13-15 January 1993 and entered into force on
29 April 1997 comprises a regime of comprehensive declarations together with both routine
and challenge inspections as well as provisions for the investigation of alleged use and the
monitoring of the destruction of declared chemical weapons and chemical weapon production
facilities.    Routine inspections are to carry out "on-site verification" of declared facilities
producing either permitted quantities of chemical warfare agents or production of precursors
and other specified chemicals having permitted applications.   "On-site challenge inspections"
can be requested by any State Party of "any facility or location in the territory or in any other
place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of
clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance" with the
provisions of the CWC (Article IX, para 8).   In the case of investigations of alleged use, the
inspection team shall have "the right of access to any or all areas which could be affected by
the alleged use of chemical weapons.   It shall also have the right of access to hospitals,
refugee camps and other locations it deems relevant to the effective investigation of the
alleged use of chemical weapons" (Verification Annex, Part XI, para 15).  Thus, on-site
verification measures are central to the CWC in its inspections, investigations and monitoring
of destruction.
15.   The relevance of the provisions of the CWC to the BTWC is two fold.  First, both
Conventions prohibit the development and production of weapons which attack people -- in
the one case by non-living materials (chemicals) and in the other by living materials (micro-
organisms) and their non-living products (toxins).   Second, there is an overlap -- and rightly
so -- between the two Conventions in that both cover toxins.   Thus the CWC and its
verification regime applies to toxins -- and examples of toxins, such as saxitoxin and ricin,
are listed in the CWC Schedules -- as does the BTWC.
                                                
10United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, United Nations 93-05070, 1993.
16.   Consequently, several of the provisions of the CWC, such as those for the carrying out
of "on-site challenge inspections", are worthy of further consideration as they could well
serve as a basis or model for the drawing up of a comparable regime for the BTWC.   These
are considered later in this paper.
UNSCOM Inspections
17.   Although the situation in respect of UNSCOM and Iraq is unique, it is relevant to
consider what lessons can be drawn concerning the importance of on-site investigations.
18.   Following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the coalition war against
Iraq in early 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991)11 on 3
April 1991  which set out the requirements for the cease-fire.    This resolution also required
in Section C that Iraq was to eliminate, under international supervision, its chemical and
biological weapons stockpiles and its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km.  Iraq
was required to submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the Resolution’s adoption,
a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of such weapons, and the Secretary-General
was to develop a plan for creating a Special Commission to "carry out immediate on-site
inspection of Iraq's biological chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations
and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself" in order to
take possession of these weapons and supervise their destruction.  The Secretary-General was
also required to develop, in consultation with the Special Commission, a plan for the future
ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these weapons and
missiles.
19.   Following the acceptance by Iraq of Resolution 687 (1991) and the setting up of the
Special Commission, an exchange of letters of 6 and 17 May 1991 between the Secretary-
General and the Government of Iraq agreed the status, privileges and immunities of the
Special Commission and its visiting teams.    These included:
a.  Right to unimpeded access to any site or facility for the purpose of on-site
inspection whether such site or facility be above or below ground
b.  Right to request, receive, examine and copy any record, data or information or
examine, retain, move or photograph, including videotape, any item relevant to the
Special Commission's activities and to conduct interviews
c. Right to designate any site whatsoever for observation, inspection or other
monitoring activity and for storage, destruction or rendering harmless items described
in resolution 687 (1991).
As Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 687 (1991), in August 1991 the Security
Council adopted Resolution 707 (1991)12 which demanded inter alia  that Iraq ensure the
                                                
11United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution establishing detailed measures for a cease-fire,
including deployment of the United Nations Observer Unit; arrangements for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait
border; the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their
reconstitution, under the supervision of a Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA; and
creation of a compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,
S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991.
12United Nations Security Council,  Security Council Resolution demanding that Iraq provide full disclosure of
its weapon programmes as required by Security Council Resolution 687(1991) and allow UNSCOM, the IAEA
complete enjoyment, in accordance with its previous undertakings, of the privileges,
immunities and facilities accorded to the representatives of the Special Commission and the
IAEA.   The provisions in the agreement with Iraq are recapitulated, elaborated and
reinforced in the Special Commission's plan13 for the future ongoing monitoring and
verification (OMV) of Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to retain, possess, develop,
construct or otherwise acquire any of the proscribed weapons systems.
20.   Some six years later, UNSCOM had mounted from outside of Iraq close to 200
inspections in Iraq -- many of which had involved on-site inspections of one or more facilities
or locations -- and many more on-site visits carried out by the staff of the Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Centre under the OMV plan.   Over 50 of the 200 inspections
have been in respect of Iraq's biological weapons programme.   Currently some 86 biological
sites are being regularly monitored14 under the OMV plan with over 150 visits being carried
out to these sites in a six month period15.   The achievements of UNSCOM in uncovering the
Iraqi biological weapons programme in the face of the Iraqi concealment programme18 has
been critically dependent on the ability of UNSCOM to carry out on-site investigations of
sites and facilities in Iraq using on-site measures as well as benefit from the information made
available to the Commission.
21.   The UNSCOM experience has shown the immense value of the on-site measures
identified by VEREX: interviewing, visual inspection, identification of key equipment,
sampling and identification, and auditing.   The reports of UNSCOM provide valuable
insights into the value of these measures.   As examples, interviewing and auditing are
considered further below.
22.  Interviewing.    Thus, in respect of interviewing, the UNSCOM report of 15 December
199416 stated that it faced its greatest problems in accounting for Iraq’s past biological
programmes.  Iraq’s account was minimal and had no inherent logic.  While access had been
provided to interview the personnel involved in the declared programme, interviewees had
refused to answer questions relating to the programme, providing only incomplete and
misleading information.   Further detail is provided in the same report about an UNSCOM
inspection (UNSCOM 104/BW15) which had taken place from 15-22 November 1994 in
order to interview Iraqi officials who may have been associated with the past programmes in
order to clarify the following points:
* Links between the Salman Pak site and other organisations;
                                                                                                                                                       
and their inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites they wish to inspect,
S/RES/707(1991), 15 August 1991.
13United Nations Security Council,  Report of the Secretary General submitting the plan, revised pursuant to
the adoption of Security Council resolution 707(1991), for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's
compliance with the destruction or removal of weapons specified in Security Council resolution 687(1991),
S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October 1991.
14United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1997/301, 11
April 1997.
15United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (I) of Resolution 687 1991, S/1996/848, 11
October 1996.
16 United Nations Security Council, Eighth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/1994/1422 and
addendum, S/1994/1422/Add. 1, 15 December 1994.
 * The logic of the programme, including doctrine, practice, priorities, achievements,
acquisition of bio-technology and know-how, protection and medical aspects, storage
and rationale for location of the programme;
* The material balance for equipment, cell stocks and complex media acquired by
Salman Pak or the programme; and
* The real extent of intentions of the programme.
The report noted that during the inspection, the team had held discussions with 28 persons,
many of whom had never been in contact with the Commission’s experts before, including 9
of the 10 employees at Salman Pak.  Access to personnel, whose identity had not previously
been disclosed, therefore constituted a major step forward.  While the Commission remained
unconvinced that Iraq’s account of its past programme was either complete or accurate, this
team did obtain new information, the significance of which required further examination.
23.  Auditing.   A further example of the value of on-site measures is demonstrated by the
UNSCOM experience in auditing the growth media procured by Iraq.   The April 1994
UNSCOM report17 stated that Iraq had acknowledged that it had procured, through the
Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID), very large quantities of
complex growth media in 1988 but had failed to provide an accounting for the purposes of
this importation and for the use of a significant portion of it.  Iraq claimed that, while the
media had been imported by TSMID, the import was on behalf of the Ministry for Health for
the purposes of hospital diagnostic laboratories.  This importation of media by types,
quantities and packaging was grossly out of proportion to Iraq’s stated requirements for
hospital use.  Iraq explained the excessive quantities imported and the inappropriate size of
the packaging as being of a one of a kind mistake and attempted to justify the import as
appropriate and required for medical diagnostic purposes.
24.  The UNSCOM report notes, however, that for hospital diagnostic purposes, only small
quantities are needed.  According to Iraq’s declarations, which were imprecise and changing,
over the period 1987-1994 Iraq’s total hospital consumption of all such media was less than
200 kg per annum.  But in 1988 alone, TSMID imported nearly 39,000 kg of such media,
which had a manufacturer’s guarantee of 4-5 years.  A further incongruity was that, of all the
types of media required for hospital use, only a select few were “mistakenly” imported by
TSMID in large quantities.  These did not include those most frequently used in hospitals.
Furthermore, the packaging of TSMID imports was inconsistent with declared hospital usage:
diagnostic assays use very small quantities of media and so, because the media deteriorates
rapidly once the package has been opened, media for diagnostic purposes is normally
distributed in 0.1 - 1 kg packages.  However, the media imported by Iraq in 1988 was
packaged in 25 - 100 kg drums.  This style of packaging was consistent with the large scale
use of media associated with the production of biological agents.  The types of media
imported were suitable for the production of anthrax and  botulinum, known biological
warfare agents researched by Iraq in its declared biological and military programme.
25.   The Special Commission had only accounted for some 22 tonnes of the 39 tonnes of
complex media imported by TSMID in 1988.  The media accounted for was still stored in
Iraq (in large packages) and was under the Commission’s monitoring regime.  However,
                                                
17United Nations Security Council, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation
of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/284, 10 April 1995.
some 17 tonnes remained unaccounted for.  Iraq claimed that this quantity was distributed in
original packages to numerous hospitals in 1989 but that it was all destroyed (along with
documentation concerning its distribution, storage and consumption in hospitals) during riots
that occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf War.  It was claimed that no media was distributed
to hospitals in regions where no riots occurred, eg in the Baghdad region.  No attempts were
made by Iraq to resupply the affected regions or hospitals to compensate for losses, although
large amounts of the same imported media in good condition were still available in Iraq.
26.   Iraq had initially presented a set of documents in an attempt to prove that media had
been received by a Ministry of Health storage site and had been partly distributed to certain
regional health centres.  The report states that "Iraq subsequently admitted that these
documents had in fact been “recreated” and now claims that all originals have been
destroyed, misplaced or lost."  [Emphasis added]
27.   The UNSCOM report also noted that Commission had information that, in addition to
media delivered to Iraq in 1988, quantities of media had also been purchased by Iraq in 1989
and 1990.  Evidence of additional supplies in large packages had been found in Iraq.  This
undermined Iraq’s declaration that the TSMID purchases in 1988 had been a one of a kind
mistake as to the types and packaging of media imported, as did the fact that the Ministry of
Health continued, through its own import division, its regular small quantity purchases of
media consistent with its diagnostic requirements through the period, including the purchase
of kilogram quantities of two growth media only months after TSMID purchased 2.25 tonnes
of the same media.  Iraq’s current accounting of media importation and disposal was not
acceptable.  Full and substantial accounting by Iraq for the media, eminently suitable for
production of biological agents, was an essential requirement.
28.   Even though the UNSCOM and Iraq situation is unique, it does serve to underline the
vital necessity for on-site investigations in achieving transparency and determining whether
facilities and locations are involved in proscribed programmes.   The examples provided
above of the value of two measures -- interviewing and auditing -- show how such measures
can identify major anomalies.   It is worth noting that in the BTWC context, States that are
compliant have nothing to fear from such measures as their activities will be permitted and
major anomalies will not, unlike the Iraq case, be found.
On-site Investigations
29.   It is evident that the concept of on-site investigations is widely accepted as a central
measure in both chemical and biological arms control regimes.   It is also central to other
arms control regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and those relating
to conventional forces such as CFE.   The VEREX discussions recognised that on-site
measures had a potentially important role to play in a future strengthened BTWC and the role
of on-site investigations has rightly received much attention in the subsequent Ad Hoc Group
negotiations.   On-site inspection is central to the CWC in respect of routine and challenge
inspections, the investigation of allegations of use and the monitoring of the destruction of
chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities.    The CWC has a carefully
negotiated set of measures that strike a balance between ensuring that the on-site inspections
are effective and the protection of sensitive information not related to chemical weapons.
This set of measures merits careful consideration as the basis of a similar set of measures for
the strengthening of the BTWC.    The importance of on-site inspections, particularly in the
face of attempts to conceal proscribed capabilities, has been clearly demonstrated by
UNSCOM.
Ad Hoc Group
30.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) under the chairmanship of Ambassador Toth of Hungary
held a procedural meeting on 3 - 5 January 199518 and then substantive meetings on 10 -21
July 199519, 27 November - 8 December 199520, 15 - 26 July 199621, 16 -27 September
199622 and 3-21 March 199723.   The AHG has functioned by the appointment of four Friends
of the Chair (FOC) who chair the sessions concerned with the four elements of the mandate:
a.   Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria - Dr Ali Mohammadi of the Islamic
Republic
b.   Confidence-Building and Transparency Measures - Ambassador Tibor Toth of
Hungary
c.   Measures to Promote Compliance - Mr Stephen Pattison then Ambassador Sir
Michael Weston of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
d.   Measures Related to Article X - Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile.
 31.   At successive AHG meetings, the FOC have produced papers that reflect the
discussions that have taken place yet are without prejudice to the positions of delegations on
the issues under consideration in the Ad Hoc Group and does not imply agreement on the
scope or content of the paper.   These FOC papers are considered by the AHG in plenary
session and amended as requested by delegations so that they reflect the views expressed
before they are accepted for attachment to the procedural reports of the meetings.
32.   At the Fourth Review Conference  of the BTWC held on 25 November to 6 December
1996, the States Parties in their Final Declaration24 stated that:
The Conference welcomed the decision of the Ad Hoc Group, in order to fulfil its
mandate, to intensify its work with a view to completing it as soon as possible before
                                                
18  United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/3, 6 January 1995.
19  United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/28, 24 July 1995.
20  United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/29, 12 December 1995.
21 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/31,  26 July 1996.
22United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/32,  27 September 1996.
23United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Procedural Report, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/34,  27 March 1997.
24United Nations,  Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, December 1996.
the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and submit its report, which shall
be adopted by consensus, to the States Parties, to be considered at a Special
Conference.   The Conference encourages the Ad Hoc Group to review its method of
work and to move to a negotiating format in order to fulfil its mandate.
It was therefore encouraging at the next AHG meeting in March 199723 to see the inclusion
as Annex II of the procedural report of a list of "Possible Structural Elements of a Protocol to
the BWC" together with the understanding that in the July 1997 AHG meeting a move is
probable to a negotiating format which will address a rolling text to be issued before the July
meeting.
33.   The FOC papers summarising the extensive discussion thus far in the AHG on on-site
investigations will become the basis for the rolling text and thus be developed further and
fleshed out in a negotiating format at the July 1997 and subsequent AHG meetings.    The
March 1997 AHG meeting23 saw the inclusion in the procedural report of papers prepared by
the FOC on compliance measures which addressed Declarations, Investigations of Non-
Compliance Concerns, Other Visits (including Non-Challenge Visits and Clarification Visits)
and Measures to Strengthen the Implementation of Article III.    In respect of on-site
investigations, the FOC paper on investigations of a non-compliance concern addresses the
following key elements:
Types of investigation
Consultation, clarification and cooperation
Initiation
Information to be submitted with a request for an investigation
Screening (to guard against abusive requests)
Pre-investigation procedures
Access/conduct of investigations
Measures to guard against abuse during investigation
Implementation of specific on-site measures
Post-investigation procedures
whilst the paper on other visits and procedures whilst not as developed as that on
investigations of non-compliance concerns includes the following headings:
Non-challenge visits
Procedures
Initiation
Implementation
Clarification procedures/visits
Procedures
Initiation
Implementation
Outcome
34.    There is thus a very welcome broad consensus developing in the AHG towards a legally
binding instrument with on-site investigations whether of non-compliance concerns or other
visits such as non-challenge and clarification visits.   It is also encouraging to see the
recognition of a package of on-site measures with specific identification of:
for facility investigations
Interviewing
Visual Observation
Identification of Key Equipment
Auditing
Medical Examination
Sampling and Identification
and, for field investigations
Access
Interviewing of eyewitnesses
Interviewing of potentially exposed humans
Interviewing of officials/personnel
Visual Observation
Disease related examination
Sampling and identification
Collection of background information and data.
35.   It is apparent from both consideration of the CWC procedures and the experience of
UNSCOM, that investigation teams need to have a range of measures available which they
can select and use as appropriate for the circumstances of the particular investigation.    The
CWC experience indicates that the inspected State can utilise managed access procedures so
as to safeguard specific information that it regards as sensitive subject always to the inspected
State being under the clear obligation to satisfy the non-compliance concern by providing
other information.
36.   The July 1997 AHG meeting should see the development of a rolling text and the
transition of the AHG to a negotiating format.   It is thus timely to consider some of the
detailed provisions in the CWC in respect of on-site investigations as these could with
advantage be drawn upon by the AHG in fleshing out the necessary details for the rolling text.
CWC On-Site Investigation Provisions
37.   Article IX of the CWC on Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding sets out the
procedures for challenge inspections which are elaborated and detailed in Part X of the
verification Annex.   Key points made in Article IX in respect of challenge inspections are
that:
a.  On-site challenge inspection can be requested of any facility or location (para 8)
b.  On-site challenge inspection is for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any
questions concerning possible non-compliance with the Convention (para 8)
c.   Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within the
scope of the Convention and to provide in the inspection request all appropriate
information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-
compliance with the Convention (para 9)
d.   Each State party has the right to have the challenge inspection conducted
anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director General
(para 8)
e.  The inspected State Party shall have the right and the obligation to make every
reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the Convention (para 11)
f.  The inspected State Party shall have the obligation to provide access within the
requested site for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern
regarding possible non-compliance (para 11)
g. The inspected State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive
installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related
to the Convention (para 11)
h.  The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting the challenge
inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and
timely accomplishment of its mission. (para 19)
i.  If the inspected  State Party proposes arrangements to demonstrate compliance,
alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable effort,
through consultations with the inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities
for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating its compliance (para 20).
38.   Article IX also contains provisions to safeguard against frivolous or abusive requests:
a.   Each State party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being
taken to avoid abuse (para 9)
b.   The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the
inspection request, decide by a three-quarters majority of all of its members against
carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be
frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of the Convention (para 17)
c.   The Executive Council shall review the final report of the inspection team and
address any concerns inter alia  as to whether the right to request a challenge
inspection has been abused (para 22)
d.   In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting
State party should bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspection
(para 23).
39.   Part X of the Verification Annex of the CWC sets out detailed provisions for the
carrying out of challenge inspections under Article IX of the Convention.   Some 61
paragraphs address the following broad topics:
A.  Designation and Selection of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants
B.  Pre-Inspection Activities
C.  Conduct of Inspections
D.  Post-Inspection Activities.
40.  The section on pre-inspection activities is primarily concerned with the securing of the
perimeter of the site to be inspected and the monitoring of all vehicular exit activity.   It also
includes provisions for a pre-inspection briefing and preparation of an inspection plan:
a.   The inspected State party shall provide a safety and logistical briefing to the
inspection team prior to access to facilitate development of an inspection plan (para
32)
b.   In the course of this briefing, the inspected State party may indicate to the
inspection team the equipment, documentation, or areas it considers sensitive and not
related to the purpose of the challenge inspection (para 33)
c.   The inspection team shall be briefed on the availability of facility personnel and
records (para 33)
d.  After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall prepare, on the basis of
the information available and appropriate to it, an initial inspection plan which
specifies the activities to be carried out by the inspection team, including the specific
areas of the site to which access is desired (para 34).
41.   The section on the conduct of inspections sets out detailed provisions concerning access
and how managed access may be used to protect sensitive information not related to chemical
weapons:
a.  The inspected State Party shall provide access within the requested perimeter as
well as, if different, the final perimeter.    The extent and nature of access to a
particular place or places within these perimeters shall be negotiated between the
inspection team and the inspected State Party on a managed access basis (para 38)
b.   In meeting this requirement to provide access, the inspected State Party shall be
under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access taking into account any
constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and
seizures (para 41)
c.   The inspected State Party has the right under managed access to take such
measures as are necessary to protect national security (para 41)
d.   These provisions may not be invoked by the inspected State Party to conceal
evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under the Convention
(para 41)
e.   If the inspected State Party provides less than full access to places, activities, or
information, it shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide
alternative means to clarify the possible non-compliance concern that generated the
challenge inspection (para 42)
f.   The inspection team shall use only those methods necessary to provide sufficient
relevant facts to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with the
provisions of the Convention, and shall refrain from activities not relevant thereto
(para 44)
g.   Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall not be
retained (para 44).
42.   Managed access is addressed in a separate subsection (paras 46 to 52) which includes:
a.   The inspection team shall take into consideration suggested modifications of the
inspection plan and proposals which may be made by the inspected State Party to
ensure that sensitive equipment, information or areas, not related to chemical
weapons, are protected (para 46)
b.  The inspection team and the inspected State party shall negotiate:
- The extent of access to any particular place or places
- The particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be conducted by
the inspection team
- The performance of particular activities by the inspected State Party, and
- The provision of information by the inspected State Party (para 47)
c.  The inspected State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive
installations and protect disclosure of confidential information and data not related to
chemical weapons.  Such measures may include, inter alia :
- Removal of sensitive papers from office spaces
- Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores and equipment
- Shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic
systems
- Logging off of computer systems and turning off of data indicating devices
- Restriction of sample analysis to presence or absence of chemicals listed in
Schedules 1, 2 and 3 or appropriate degradation products
- Using random selective access techniques whereby inspectors are requested
to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to inspect;
the same principle can be applied to the interior or content of sensitive
buildings
- In exceptional cases, giving only individual inspectors access to certain parts
of the inspection site (para 48).
d.  The inspected State party shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to the
inspection team that any object, building, structure, container or vehicle to which the
inspection team has not had full access is not used for purposes related to the possible
non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request (para 49).
43.   The CWC has thus a series of provisions aimed at ensuring that on-site challenge
inspections can be made of "any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party" and will clarify and resolve "any questions
concerning possible non-compliance" with the Convention.    These provisions clearly place
the obligation on the inspected State Party "to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its
compliance" whilst also having provisions to protect against frivolous or abusive requests and
to protect sensitive facilities, equipment and information not related to chemical weapons.
A parallel set of provisions, tailored appropriately for the BTWC, would appear necessary for
a strengthened BTWC.
Conclusions
44.   Consideration of the VEREX, CWC and UNSCOM experience shows that on-site
investigations are an essential and central element for an effective verification regime.  The
AHG has made good progress in identifying on-site investigations on non-compliance
concerns together with non-challenge visits and clarification visits as elements of the legally
binding instrument for the BTWC.   It is also evident that a package of measures need to be
available for the investigation team to draw on according to the particular circumstances.
The provisions of the CWC in respect to its requirements for on-site inspection are highly
relevant and should be considered by the AHG as a basis from which to work in fleshing out
the rolling text for the legally binding instrument for the BTWC.
